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Most quantitative easing programmes primarily involve central banks acquiring government 
liabilities in return for central bank reserves. In all cases this process is undertaken by purchasing 
these liabilities from private sector intermediaries rather than directly from the government. This 
paper estimates the cost of this round-trip transaction – government issuance of liabilities and 
central bank purchases of those liabilities in the secondary market – for the UK. I estimate that this 
cost amounts to about 0.5% of the total value of QE (over £1.8 billion in my sample). I also find some 
evidence that this figure is inflated by the unusual design of UK QE operations.  
Keywords: Quantitative Easing, Auctions, Government Bonds 
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Although quantitative easing (QE) programmes vary in design, the four major ones – those of the US, 
Euro-Area, Japan and the UK – have primarily involved the creation of central bank reserves in return 
for government bonds. In all four cases this has involved purchasing bonds from private sector 
intermediaries despite the fact that significant government bond sales to the same intermediaries 
took place over the same period. A seemingly simpler procedure would be the direct acquisition of 
these liabilities from the government through the creation of reserves, thus removing the need for 
the government to issue these liabilities to the market in the first place. In both cases the end result 
would be the creation of reserves backed by central bank holdings of government liabilities and so 
the overall impact would be almost identical. So the round-trip approach of selling bonds to private 
sector intermediaries and then buying them (or, in fact, similar ones) back shortly afterwards has an 
almost identical impact to not selling the bonds to the private sector in the first place. Probably the 
key difference is that the round trip approach involves a debt sale and a debt purchase – both of 
which incur transaction costs. 
Whilst it is hard to establish exactly why the round trip approach has been adopted in all cases, 
many argue that the direct financing approach is cosmetically worse in the sense of making the 
operation of quantitative easing look more like the type of monetary financing that occurs when the 
fiscal authority forces the central bank to finance government spending. Thus direct financing might 
undermine the perception of central bank independence even though the end result (central bank 
acquisition of government liabilities in return for central bank reserves) is the same.  This issue is 
discussed in more detail in the next sub-section, but the main objective of this paper is to estimate 
the total transactions costs involved in the round trip approach in the case of the UK’s QE 
programme. 
As well as this broad policy question, this paper looks in detail at how UK debt sales and purchases 














debt purchases are conducted. I find that the small number of bidders per bond and the fact that the 
auction allocation is based on market prices the bidders themselves have a significant role in 
creating, opens up the process to uncertainty and potential manipulation. I find some evidence that 
these design issues have resulted in higher transactions costs relative to alternative reverse auction 
design used by most other Central Banks such as the Federal Reserve.  
1.1. Central Bank direct acquisition of Government Liabilities 
Although the first Central Banks were created to help finance government, this role has diminished 
to such an extent that about two-thirds of Central Banks surveyed by Jácome et al (2012) are 
expressly forbidden from funding the government directly or are limited to short term loans2. The 
reason for this change is clearly related to the increased role of Central Bank’s in creating fiat money 
and the temptations this role created for government. Thus as Ricardo (1824) notes "It is said that 
Government could not be safely entrusted with the power of issuing paper money; that it would 
most certainly abuse it.…There would, I confess, be great danger of this, if Government--that is to 
say, the ministers--were themselves to be entrusted with the power of issuing paper money." 
However, as Ricardo’s quotation implies, it is not direct acquisition of government liabilities that is 
the key concern but the fear that the government can require the central bank to create money in 
order to acquire those liabilities. So, as Central Banks have become increasingly independent from 
government the risks associated with direct financing have diminished. In a key work on the topic, 
Cotterelli (1993) notes, so long as the Central Bank is independent of government and any direct 
financing (that the Central Bank might want to initiate) occurs at market (not subsidised) rates and 
involves marketable securities (so the Central Bank can sell them to the private sector if necessary) 
then a prohibition on primary market purchases by the Central Bank has no economic impact and 
simply serves as an ‘institutional signal’ of the separation of Government and Central Bank. The 
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Central Bank Governance Group (BIS(2009)) reaches a similar conclusion, arguing that prohibitions 
on direct financing can be seen as a ‘belt and braces’ policy in the presence of Central Bank 
independence and market determined interest rates. 
It is also worth noting that a limitation on direct financing does not stop government’s forcing 
Central Banks to finance them indirectly if those Central Banks are not independent. 
Stasavage(1997) describes an example of this in the case of the CFA Franc Zone where, in the face of 
restrictions on direct financing, a number of governments required their Central Bank to make 
subsidised loans to a number of commercials and development banks who then became a major 
source of finance to governments and related public entities This form of financing was a key factor 
behind the fiscal indiscipline that characterised the Zone over this period. 
It is arguable that, although limitations on direct financing are neither a necessary nor sufficient 
condition to stop governments requiring their Central banks to finance them, they have, historically 
at least, been a relatively costless measure that has some signalling benefit. However, in recent 
years where unconventional monetary policy has resulted in the dramatic expansion in several 
Central Banks’ balance sheets, the cost of these limitations has increased since government debt has 
generally been the key asset acquired in those expansions. Indeed, it is interesting that the Central 
Bank of Brazil, which until it was overtaken by the Bank of Japan in 2012, had the largest balance 
sheet in the G20 (in terms of gross central bank assets as a share of GDP) and holds a large portfolio 
of relatively short maturity government debt has created a clear demarcation whereby it is 
constitutionally prohibited from direct lending to the government, but may purchase government 
securities in the primary market for monetary policy purposes. This provision allows it to roll over its 
stock of government debt without incurring secondary market transactions cost. It is also instructive 
that Jácome et al (2012) classify arrangements like Brazil’s as being in the group that prohibit direct 














purposes and what is required for monetary policy purposes.  This demarcation by purpose is also 
highlighted by the Central Bank Governance Group (BIS(2009)).  
The Brazilian example suggests that when Central Bank balance sheets grow based on acquiring 
government debt, the transactions costs incurred in acquiring that debt mean that the benefits of 
allowing Central Bank participation in the primary market for government debt may outweigh the 
costs of abandoning the ‘belt and braces’ approach – particularly if the demarcation between 
government financing and monetary policy purposes is made clear. This paper aims to estimate 
those transactions costs in the case of the UK. 
Thus this paper aims to establish if the round-trip approach to quantitative easing undertaken by the 
UK involves significant transactions. If such costs were small then a ‘belt and braces’ approach seems 
relatively harmless.  If, on the other hand, significant transactions costs were incurred (which is what 
I find) then the question of why a prohibition on primary market purchases is required at a time of 
significant Central Bank government debt acquisition and holdings3 becomes a policy relevant one.  
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2. UK Debt Issuance and Quantitative Easing. 
As a preliminary analysis, it is useful to look at two aspects of QE that might have precluded direct 
financing rather than a round-trip approach, namely that either the scale or maturity profile of QE 
purchases could not be matched by new issuance. 
Between March 2009 and October 2012 (the period I analyse in this paper) there were two distinct 
periods of Bank of England bond purchases (QE1 March 2009-December 2009 and QE2 September 
2011-October 20124), Figure 1 shows cumulative conventional bond issuance and bond purchases 
over this period. 
Figure 1: Cumulative Gross Issuance and Purchases 12/3/09 to 31/10/12 
 
Source DMO and APF 
 
As Figure 1 shows, over the whole period there were significantly more sales than purchases and 
that over the two sub-periods when purchases occurred the rate of purchases was almost identical 
to the rate of sales (see Table 1). Thus, relatively small changes in timing could have allowed the rate 
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 The period from July to October 2012 is sometimes referred to as QE3 but I have merged this period into QE2 
































of purchases and sales to be exactly aligned. It is also noteworthy that neither the Bank of England 
Monetary Policy Committee nor the Treasury gave a precise indication on the timing of purchases 
and issuance respectively and so the timing of actual auctions was an operational rather than 
strategic decision for both institutions. 
One other possible explanation for a round trip approach to QE transactions could be that the 
secondary objective of the programme was to substantially alter the average maturity of existing 
debt.  This would be akin to ‘operation twist’ where purchases of longer maturity debt are funded by 
sales of short term debt with the express intention of shortening the average maturity of 
outstanding debt (and potentially lowering long term yields – see Swanson (2011)). In order to 
assess the difference in maturity of debt purchases and sales over this period, Figure 2 shows the 
cumulative average duration (a more precise measure of the timing of cash flows than maturity) 5 of 
conventional debt sales and purchases as well as the duration of outstanding conventional debt over 
the QE period (table 1 below focuses on the two QE periods in more detail) . Whilst it is true that the 
average duration of purchases (10.2 years) was somewhat longer than that of sales (8.9 years, over 
the whole period), the difference was not large and so the same impact on the average duration of 
outstanding debt could easily have been achieved with direct financing by reducing the duration of 
residual issuance (i.e. issuance still required between the two QE periods) to about 6 years. Again 
since neither the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee nor the Treasury gave maturity 
targets for either purchases or issuance, it is hard to argue that either purchases or sales were 
strongly focussed on reducing the average duration of outstanding debt over this period.  
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Figure 2: Cumulative Duration of Conventional Purchases and Issuance and Duration of 
Outstanding Stock of Debt 12/3/2009 31/10/12 
 
Source DMO and APF 
2.1 Matching Sales and Purchases 
Since, when calculating transactions costs, this paper implicitly assumes that all secondary market 
transactions associated with QE could have been replaced with primary market ones it is worth 
spending a little time judging if this could in fact have been done in practice.  
Table 1: Value and Duration of Sales and Purchases over the two QE periods 
 QE1 period QE2 period 
Purchases Sales Purchase Sales 
Value (£bn) 198.3 200.6 176.7 198.5 
Duration (years) 9.2 8.8 10.8 9.4 
Value and average duration of sales and purchases over QE1 period (March 2009-December 2009) and QE2 
period (September 2011-October 2012)  
Table 1 shows both the value and duration of issuance and purchases over the two periods of 
quantitative easing, they confirm impression from the charts above, in both periods the total value 
of sales was larger than the value of purchases, but the sales were generally at a slightly shorter 
duration.  In the analysis below I allow for this duration effect by calculating transactions costs on 










































held in private sector hands at the end of the QE period was identical to that which occurred in 
practice  
Thus although many of the precise details of issuance and purchases over this period were somehow 
different (e.g. issuance auctions tended to be larger than purchases one, the same bond was never 
sold and purchased in the same week) small changes which would not have materially changed the 
overall stock or duration of debt or effected the overall strategy of either the Treasury or the Bank of 
England would have allowed purchases and issuance to be perfectly aligned.  
 
2.2 Debt Sale and Purchase Techniques in detail 
Before measuring transactions costs it is useful to summarise how government bonds were sold and 
purchased over the period I study (March 2009 and October 2012). 
Over this period the Debt Management Office (DMO) adopted three issuance techniques to sell 
Conventional Debt; Auctions, Syndications and Tenders 
 Auctions. Over this sample, the vast majority of debt (about 86% by value) was sold at 
auction. The average amount sold per auction was about £3.5 billion. At such auctions the 
exact amount and details of the bond for sale are announced about a week before the 
auction. At the auction itself Gilt-Edged Market Makers (GEMMS) submit bids (price and 
amount) to purchase the bond and the bids are filled from the highest down on a bid price 
basis until the full amount is allocated6 
 Syndications. Given the scale of bond issuance required over recent years, the DMO has 
begun to conduct a few large scale syndications (average size in our sample was £5.6 billion). 
At a syndication, lead managing banks are appointed who, over the period of the offer, build 
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a book of demand through ongoing dialogue with investors. The book closes and the deal is 
priced when the Lead Managers and issuer agree.  Thereafter the Lead Managers and issuer 
agree the allocation of bonds to investors. Syndications also involve the payment of fees to 
the lead manager. These fees are not included in the estimate of auction concession. 
 Tenders. These are small scale auctions (average size about £1 billion) arranged at short 
notice (minimum of one hour) which are used when the DMO ‘judges there to be excess 
demand’ in a particular bond. The allocation process is the same as at standard auctions. 
 
The method by which the Bank of England purchased bonds over this period is a little more involved. 
 QE Operations. The Bank of England announced a maturity range (for most of this period 
there were three ranges - short, medium or long ) and a total value of bonds (average of 
£1.9 billion in our sample) in that range it offered to buy at the operation. Thus market 
participants could offer any eligible bond in the announced range for that operation (on 
average about 5 different bonds were offered). The final details of each operation were 
normally announced on the Thursday of the preceding week, though the general pattern 
was fairly predictable. On the operation day itself GEMMs had half an hour (14:15 to 14:45) 
to submit offers (bond, offer yield and amount) to sell. After receiving these offers the Bank 
of England would then calculate the difference between each offer yield and the market 
yield of the relevant bond at the end of the operation (14:45). Given these differences the 
Bank then purchased whatever bond had been offered at the highest yield relative to the 
market yield at the end of the auction period and then worked down through the offers 
until the full amount had been allocated (see Bank of England Market Notice 100108). So for 
example, if the Bank of England received offers of both a 10-year and 9-year bond at 3% 
yield and observed that the market yield of the 10-year bond at the end of the operation 














had a higher offered yield (lower price) relative to the market yield observed at the end of 
operation. As discussed in section 4 this allocation method is unusual (probably unique) and 
presents a number of practical problems. 
Although the precise details of the operations (maturity range of bonds purchased, timing of 
operations etc.) changed several times over the QE period (see McLaren et al (2014) for 
details), the underlying purchase method remained as described above. 
3. The Transactions Costs of Debt Sales and QE purchases 
In this paper I measure transactions costs as the difference between the bond yield received at the 
market operation (either sale or purchase) and the prevailing yield on that bond in the days 
surrounding the auction (I use yields rather than prices for reasons explained below and in appendix 
2). This measure is widely used in the auction underpricing literature (see for example Simon (1994), 
Nyborg et al.(2002)) as it allows for the fact that the market yield tends to change around an auction 
so ,for example, yields tend to rise (prices fall) in the run up to a sale and then fall back after the sale 
has taken place.  The extent to which bond sales receive a yield above the prevailing yield in the 
surrounding days (and purchases receive a yield above the prevailing level) is commonly termed the 
auction ‘concession’ since it is a measure of how different the auction yield was from the prevailing 
market yield in the days surrounding the auction. Thus my focus is on the full transactions cost of the 
operation including the short term movements in the secondary market price rather than an analysis 
of auction behaviour at the moment of the operation itself as is undertaken by Song and Zhu (2017)  
Equally, it is important to note that my measure focuses on the short term impact of the operation 
rather than the long run effect. Thus in the case of QE operations, a key policy objective of the 
operation is to lower bond yields over an extended period, so the operation actually aims to  
influence the prevailing level of bond yields over the medium to long term. However, short term 














pure transaction cost (the difference between the auction yield and the prevailing market yields 
around the auction). In that sense the approach taken here is very different to that adopted in a 
number of QE studies (see, for example, Krisnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgenson (2011) and Joyce et al 
(2010)) to measure the long run and announcement effects of the policy, instead this paper focuses 
on the short run liquidity impact of individual operations (what D’Amico and King (2013) call ‘flow 
effects’) as a way of gauging the difference between the price government bonds could be sold at 
and the price they could be purchased at in large scale official operations over the QE period.   
Overall my approach is most similar to Lou et al (2013) who study US Treasury auctions, in a similar 
way and find similar results both in terms of the size and length of the concession window. On the 
QE purchase side it is also similar to D’Amico and King (2013), though they use a somewhat different 
approach and a shorter window.  
Perhaps two aspects of the auction concession measure used in this paper are unusual. First, the 
concession is measured in terms of yield rather than price, this is because the auction concession in 
price terms rises significantly with bond maturity as might be expected given the higher price 
volatility of longer maturity bonds. In yield terms the auction concession is less correlated with 
maturity allowing a cleaner estimate that is comparable across maturities (see appendix 2). Second, 
the calculation of the concession is calculated up to 2 days before and after the auction. This is 
because there is clear evidence that bond yields move significantly over this period, thus, for 
example, the auction concession is significantly larger when using t-2 and t+2 as comparator than 
with t-1 and t+1 though there is no significant effect beyond t-2 and t+2 for either sales or 
purchases7. Whilst such a long window is rarely used in the government auction underpricing 
literature, an even more extended period of yield impact is found by Lou et al (2013) in the case of 
US Treasury Auctions. In the UK case, the infrequent trading in the more illiquid bonds could be also 
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help explain the extended window of yield impact (Nath (2003) estimates that, although the top 5 
most heavily traded gilts average almost 40 public trades per day, outside the top 30 the average is 
less than 1 per day). Certainly, other studies of auction concessions for UK government bonds have 
also found a longer window is required (see Breedon et al (2012) and Ahmed and Steeley (2008)). 
One disadvantage of the longer window is that more general movements in the bond market may 
influence the results for the overall concession. However, adjustments for the general trend in yields 
around auctions make very little difference8 to the results so the more straight forward un-adjusted 
concessions are used throughout this paper.  
In the case of QE bond purchases, since the operation involves purchasing a range of bonds in a 
single operation, the yield concession is calculated as the average concession across all the bonds 
purchased in a given operation rather than treating each bond purchased as an individual event. This 
approach is consistent with the standard approach used in event studies (starting with Jaffe(1974)) 
since it eliminates correlation across the event and is also consistent with the idea that each 
operation should be viewed as a single event (rather than multiple ones). However, treating each 
bond purchased as a single event and using the ADJ-BMP statistic that adjusts for the cross-event 
correlation (as described in Kolari and Pynnonen (2010)) gives similar results. 
In Table 2 we use both standard t-tests and the Mann Whitney U test to check for the significance of 
transactions costs. The latter non parametric test is used as it is more efficient in the presence of 
non-normal distributions which may be an issue in this case given the range of different bonds 
analysed. Table 2 simply measures average transaction costs by type of operation, a more detailed 
analysis of the determinants of these transactions costs in presented in Appendix 2. 
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Table 2: Estimated Transactions Costs (in yield basis points).  
End of day yields from 2 days before to 2 days after, relative to average accepted yield at operation in basis 
points for all operations between March 2009 and May 2012. For sales the concession is end of day yield 
minus operation yield, for purchases it is operation yield minus end of day yield. N is number of operations, in 
the case of QE the first figure is the total number of QE operations and the second figure is the total number of 
bond purchases (since there are several bonds purchased at each operation). Smaller QE operations of less 
than £1bn, such as those used to offset redemptions, are excluded.  *,**,*** indicates significant at the 10%, 
5% and 1% level based on standard t-test, †,††,††† indicates significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level based on 
Mann-Whitney U test. 
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As Table 2 shows, there is evidence of significant over pricing for total purchases on all comparisons 
whilst for sales the results are somewhat weaker with the clearest evidence of underpricing 
occurring at the t-2 and t horizons. The results for sales are similar to those of Lou et al (2013) for 
the US who find about a 2bp concession for 10 year bonds over a somewhat longer (5 day) window 
Looking in detail at different types of operation, there is some evidence that QE operations in QE1 
had a higher concession, though not significantly so. On the sales side, the 9 syndications seem to 














conclusions. Perhaps the most interesting result is that at t-2, t-1 and t+2 QE purchases have a 
significantly larger average concession than sales, I return to this result in section 4.   
Given the results in table 2 it is possible to estimate the total transactions cost involved in a round 
trip approach to quantitative easing. Using the average yield concessions and assuming that the 
issuance that would not have been undertaken (due to direct sales to the government) was 
conducted in the same proportion of auctions, syndications and tenders that occurred over this 
period but was at a significantly shorter duration (around 6 years) so that the average duration of 
outstanding debt remains the same as actually occurred.  This figure comes out at £1.85 billion (on 
the t-2 comparison) which is close to ½% of the total value of QE operations (£375 billion). The figure 
is smaller on other comparisons though t+2 is similar at about £1.69 billion.  
As noted above, the cost of sales was appreciably lower than that of purchases (about 40% less on 
average) even though the high cost of the small number of syndications was a substantial 
contributor to the overall cost of sales. 
Table 3: Estimated Costs of QE Programme (in £million).  
Using the yield concession results, this table estimates the total transactions costs involved in the UK’s 
quantitative easing programme. It adjusts for differences in both the in amount and duration of sales and 
purchases so that the costs are consistent with leaving a stock of debt in public hands that is equal in amount 
and duration to the stock currently held. Duration Adj is the reduced cost of issuing shorter duration debt that 
would have left the duration of outstanding debt the same as occurred after QE. 
 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 
Purchases 1182 726 181 660 974 
    QE1 563 421 164 543 589 
    QE2 620 305 17 117 385 
Sales 668 293 277 380 716 
     Auctions 425 150 216 224 489 
    Tenders 36 18 4 -1 -1 
    Syndications 199 122 53 154 221 
Duration Adj. 8 3 4 3 7 














(% of QE) (0.49%) (0.27%) (0.12%) (0.28%) (0.45%) 
 
4. Investigating the Transactions Costs of QE operations 
Section 3 showed that there seems to be a significantly higher transactions cost involved in 
purchasing bonds in QE operations relative to the average cost of sales. Arguably, there are two 
possible explanations for this difference. First, that purchases are intrinsically more expensive to 
undertake than sales since they require existing holders to offer their bonds for sale, and second 
that the particular design of the quantitative easing programme was at fault. Although it is hard to 
distinguish between these explanations, two considerations suggest that poor design was 
responsible. First, an analysis based on the small sample of official bond purchases conducted using 
other methods does not show evidence of significant overpricing and second there are some clear 
design issues with these QE operations which could explain the high level of overpricing. 
4.1 Evidence from other official purchases 
From 1998-99 to 2000-01 the UK ran a series of large fiscal surpluses that resulted in the decision to 
conduct a series of reverse auctions to reduce outstanding debt. Overall there were six of these 
reverse auction operations conducted from July 2000 to February 2001. The design of these reverse 
auctions was in many ways similar to QE operations in the sense that a range of bonds were 
purchased at each auction based on offers from GEMMs. The key difference is that the allocation 
was based on yield deviations from an estimated yield curve model rather than the yield on each 
bond at the end of the auction. Thus, auction allocation was on the basis of each bond’s position 
relative to an estimated yield curve, offers of bonds by GEMMs where therefore allocated starting 














offers until the full amount has been purchased. This relative value approach, arguably, helps 
mitigate the problems of allocation discussed below9.  
Table 4: Average Yield Concession for Reverse Auctions 
 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 
Reverse Auctions 
N=6,(12) 
0.62 1.46 0.38 -1.60 -0.29 
Difference 











*,**,*** indicates significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level based on standard t-test, †,††,††† indicates 
significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level based on Mann-Whitney U test 
Table  4 shows that the average yield concession for the small sample of reverse auctions was 
remarkably small, so much so that the concession is significantly smaller, at the 10% level,  at t-2 and 
t+1 and t+2 (based on the Whitney Mann U test)  than for QE operations. Although it is hard to draw 
firm conclusions from such a small sample, the evidence from the reverse auctions conducted in the 
early 2000’s does not suggest that the concession for official purchases is greater than that for sales 
and therefore the particular design of QE operations may have been an important factor in 
explaining the larger concession in that case. 
Table 5: Average end of day t yield concession for other QE programmes 
Breedon 
Bank of England 
Schlepper et al. (2017) 
ECB (bunds) 
D’Amico & King (2013) 
Federal Reserve 
Song and Zhu (2017) 
Federal Reserve 
0.79 0.12 0.31 0.30 
All figures converted to give yield concession at average duration of UK QE to make the figures comparable to 
Table 2. Schlepper et al (2017) based on their specification 1 which is the most comparable to my approach 
 
Table 5 presents comparable end of auction day concessions from other studies for the ECB and 
Federal Reserve (comparisons for other days where not undertaken in these studies). In the case of 
the Federal Reserve, QE auctions are conducted in a very similar way to the UK reverse auctions of 
the early 2000’s described above where allocation is based on pricing relative to the Federal 
Reserve’s estimated yield curve model. The ECB programme is based simply on purchasing 
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government debt directly in the market rather than through scheduled auctions10 Results presented 
in this studies have been converted to yield effects at 10.2 year duration to make them comparable 
with my UK results and show that in both the Fed and ECB case the transactions costs are 
substantially smaller than in the UK11 though there are of course many differences between the QE 
programmes and government bond markets in these countries (most notably the difference in 
liquidity, with the UK market being the least liquid) so it is not possible to ascribe these differences 
simply to auction design. Notwithstanding, it is interesting that Lou et al (2013) find similar 
transactions costs for US issuance to the ones I find for the UK, since UK and US issuance techniques 
are very similar this could be interpreted as suggesting that QE operation design is important.  
 
4.2 UK QE Auction Design 
In terms of design there are two potential problems with UK quantitative easing operations 
1) Potential interaction between bidder behaviour and final allocation. Although these 
operations are too complex to be adequately analysed using standard auction theory (see 
Song and Zhu (2017)), there is a literature (e.g. Bond, Goldstein and Prescott (2009)) that 
indicates that allocation rules based on market prices that can be influenced by market 
participants are potentially problematic. In this particular case the fact that the allocation of 
purchases across bonds was based on the market yield at the end of the operation itself 
could create an indeterminacy to the extent that the yield can be influenced by the actions 
of market participants over the operation period (i.e. significant purchases may lower the 
market yield – at least temporarily - and vice versa for significant sales). Thus a market 
participant purchasing bonds in the secondary market in order to on sell to the Bank of 
England could inadvertently, or deliberately, lower the secondary market yield of that bond 
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 There are no comparable studies of Bank of Japan auctions, but the allocation is based on yield spreads like 
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than end of auction rates. 
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and thus raise the likelihood and/or improve the terms at which that bond would be 
purchased. With a maximum of 20 GEMMs participating in the auction and up to 14 bonds 
eligible, competition between participants is unlikely to eliminate this effect – especially for 
the less frequently traded bonds.  Although there is little public information on bidding, the 
fact that over 86% of bond purchases were fully allocated at a single price (i.e. almost 
certainly to a single bidder) suggests that competition in individual bonds was limited12.   
Such an effect could also explain why the yield concession on individual bonds was 
appreciably larger for more illiquid bonds (see appendix 2) where the price impact of 
secondary market purchases or sales would presumably be larger. 
Indeed, a case of deliberate price manipulation was investigated by the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) whereby a trader purchased a significant amount of the 8.75% 2017 bond 
(one of the least liquid) on the day of a QE operation and then offered them, plus a large 
position he had acquired beforehand, for sale at the operation itself. The price of this bond 
rose strongly against its near comparators during the day due to these purchases and then 
fell back when the Bank of England announced it was not accepting offers in this bond due 
to its unusual price movements during the day. The trader was later found guilty of market 
abuse and fined £662,700. Ironically the Bank of England did eventually accept offers in this 
bond at a higher price, relative to its near comparators, than it rejected at this operation. 
See Appendix 1 for further details. 
2) Use of Indicative secondary market yields. Compared with most major bond markets, the UK 
secondary market for government bonds has a low level of transparency13. So, for example, 
                                                          
12
 Certainly, full allocation at a single price did not occur in any of the issuance auctions in my sample, nor did it 
occur in any US QE auction(Song and Zhu(2017)) 
13 In the US, general access to interdealer prices through GovPx and more general price information through 
other platforms such as Espeed and brokerTec makes the market highly transparent. Similarly, access to 
interdealer information though Euro MTS and other MTS platforms make the major European government 














price/yield quotes displayed by GEMMS are indicative rather than firm (i.e. GEMMs are not 
bound to trade at the displayed quotes) and the price/yield details of recent trades are 
generally not revealed to other market participants. This makes establishing the precise 
secondary market yield problematic – particularly at the end of an auction (before the 
results announcement) when market activity is likely to be subdued14.  In the case of QE 
operations, the market yield at the end of the auction was established with reference to the 
‘live DMO price’. This price is in fact simply a mechanical average of screen quotes offered by 
GEMMs with the highest and lowest quote removed. Although there is no evidence that this 
took place, it is clear that GEMMs participating in the operation would have an incentive to 
change their quotes around the end of the auction in order to improve their chances in the 
final allocation. Indeed, it is notable that the DMO itself states that for a given bond, the 
price it publishes “is not intended to give a market price at which it could or has been 
traded” (See DMO (2011)). Indeed, it is surprising that the Bank of England did not attempt 
to avoid the possibility of quote manipulation given the on-going LIBOR fixing scandal that 
first came to light in 2008 just before QE operations began. 
As well as having a direct impact on QE operation prices, it seems likely that these two issues would 
have raised the level of uncertainty at these operations and thus added to the concession demanded 
by risk-averse GEMMs and/or final purchasers. Thus, although the evidence is not strong, it seems 
plausible to argue that the higher transactions costs associated with QE operations were due to their 
design. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has shown that there was a small (as a percentage of the total amount) but significant 
transaction cost involved in the round trip approach to quantitative easing, and although it is hard to 
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 Although there is no evidence for the UK bond markets, evidence from other markets suggest that little 














identify the recipients of these transactions costs it is unlikely to be entities that the government 
would wish to subsidise. Given this cost, it seems, therefore, that the question posed at the 
beginning of this paper – why is a round trip approach necessary? – is of more than ‘academic’ 
interest. Although ½% is small, it is important in the context of such large operations and would 
seem to justify at least some discussion of the benefits of the round-trip approach given that the 
outcome (Central Bank acquisition of Government Liabilities) is identical in both the direct and 
round-trip approaches. This question has broad relevance given the dramatic increase in the size of 
several Central Banks’ balance sheets in recent years   
As well as this broad conclusion, the results in this paper highlight the importance of careful auction 
design in reducing the transactions costs of debt issuance and purchases. The results in this paper 
suggest that unusual operation design may have been responsible for transactions costs for QE 
purchases that were significantly higher than those for sales over the same period. Similarly, results 
for larger debt sales, like syndications, suggest that that transactions costs are larger (as a 
percentage of amount sold) the larger the amount sold. This result, which was also found for the US 















APPENDIX 1: SUMMARY OF EVENTS SURRONDING THE CANCELLED AUCTION OF THE 
8.75% 2017 BOND ON 10/10/2011 
This appendix summarises the events surrounding the QE auction on 10/10/2011 which 
subsequently resulted in the fining of the trader involved by the FCA. 
The first QE auction of QE2 took place on the10th October 2011. The Bank of England invited offers 
for a range of short maturity bonds ranging in maturity from 2015 to 2020 using the auction method 
described above. A trader at one of the GEMMs had already acquired a significant position in the 
8.75% 2017 bond that was eligible for the auction and on the day of the auction aggressively bid for 
more of that bond acquiring £331.1 million between 9am and 2.30pm when the reverse auction 
took place (bids can be submitted from 2.15pm to 2.45pm). As a result of those continued 
purchases, the price of the bond rose appreciably during the day even though other comparable 
bonds had actually fallen slightly in price – see figure A1.1). 
Figure A1.1: Percentage point yield difference between end of day price on business day before 
10/10/11 reverse auction and average yield accepted at auction 










































At the auction itself, the trader offered a large amount of the bond for sale (£1.2 billion) at a yield 
significantly lower than the secondary market yield on the previous business day, but higher than 
the secondary market yield at the end of the auction period itself (given the significant price 
movement that had occurred during the day). Having seen the unusual movements in the price of 
that bond, the Bank of England announced that it would not be accepting offers for that bond in the 
auction. Subsequent investigation by the FCA found the trader guilty of deliberate price 
manipulation.  
Ironically after a few months the price of bond rose back – in relative value terms (as measured by a 
standard butterfly spread defined in figure A1.2 below)  – above the price offered in the failed 
auction (see figure A1.2). In fact, the Bank of England subsequently (at February and March 2012 
auctions) accepted offers of this bond at a higher relative value than it had rejected at the disputed 
auction, perhaps because the low level of liquidity (the 8.75% 2017 bond had the second lowest 
nominal outstanding of all bonds eligible for QE at the time) made it particularly strongly influenced 














Figure A1.2: Relative Value of the 8.75% 2017 based on butterfly spread  
Figure shows the difference between the yield on the 8.75% 2017 and the yield predicted by a linear 
interpolation between its two nearest equivalents in terms of duration (the 4% 2016 bond and the 5% 2018
15
). 
Estimated yield differential at auction is based on the accepted yield at auction of the two nearest equivalents 
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 Since the 1.75% 2017 was only created in August 2011 it was not used in this chart. However results 




































APPENDIX 2: SOME DETAILED RESULTS ON OPERATION CONCESSIONS 
This appendix gives some further evidence on the determinants of the yield concession on both sales 
and purchases.  
As a preliminary analysis to check that it is appropriate to measure the concession in yield rather 
than price terms, figures A2.1-2.2 show how the yield/price concession measured relative to t-2 
varies with duration. They show a clear tendency for the price concession to rise with the duration of 
bond being purchased/sold whilst in yield terms the concession is more consistent across durations 
though even in yield terms there does appear to be a tendency for the concession to rise with 
duration. Table A2.1 confirms that this rise in concession yield as duration increases is significant at 
two horizons (t-2 and t-1). However, at all horizons the relationship between duration and yield 
concession is less significant than that between duration and price concession. 
A2.3: Price Concession (t-2 to auction) by 
bond duration (years) 
A2.4: Yield Concession (t-2 to auction) by bond 
duration (years) 
  
Table A2.1 explores the determinants of the yield concession in more detail. It presents the results 
of estimating the relationship between operation yield concessions (both sales and purchases) 
measured at the five different horizons (t-2 through to t+2) and some potential determinants. The 






























bought/sold at each operation) - appears to have quite a strong relationship with the auction 
concession at most horizons indicating that larger operations tend to generate a larger concession.    
The duration of the bonds purchased/sold, as discussed above, tends to have a positive relationship 
with the yield concession - most notable at the t-2 and t-1 horizons. This is perhaps a little surprising 
since although longer duration implies more price volatility this is not generally the case with yield 
volatility - which tends to decline slightly with duration. Thus the lower yield volatility of long 
duration bonds might be expected to be associated with a lower rather than higher yield concession. 
Free Float is a measure of the value of each bond in private sector hands just prior to the operation 
(i.e. the total value of the bond already issued minus the amount held by the government and the 
Bank of England) Other than at horizon t (which has the surprising result that a higher free float 
increases the concession), this variable seems to have no strong relationship with the yield 
concession. However, in the case of QE operations it seems likely that if free float does have a 
relationship with free float, this would be more apparent at the individual bond level rather than in 
the average of each operation as used in Table A2.1. Results at the individual bond level are 
presented below. 
The three dummy variables give an indication of the average concession for the three types of bond 
sale (auctions, syndications and tenders) relative to QE purchase operations. The results show a 
significantly smaller concession for auctions relative to QE operations at t-1, t+1 and t+2 whilst the 















Table A2.1 Estimated Determinants of Operation Concessions 
Table shows estimated coefficients of five regressions of operation concession in yield basis points (both 
purchases and sales) calculated at different horizons (2 days before through to 2 days after) against potential 
determinants of that concession. Total sample = 353 





























































Standard Error in brackets.  *,**,*** indicates coefficient significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level based on standard t-test 
Variable Definitions 
Log(Value) = log of the total size of the operation (i.e. amount sold or purchased at the operation) 
Duration = duration of the instrument sold/purchased. For QE operations this is the average duration of bonds 
purchased at each operation. 
Log(Free Float) = Existing Free Float of the instrument sold/purchased, where free float is the total value of the 
instrument in private sector hands prior to the operation . For QE operations this is the average free float of 
bonds purchased at each operation. 
Auction = Dummy variable that equals 1 if the operation was a sale by auction. 
Syndication = Dummy variable that equals 1 if the operation was a sale by syndication. 
Tender = Dummy variable that equals 1 if the operation was a sale by tender. 
  
As discussed above, the relationship between free float  (a measure of the liquidity of an existing 
bond) and the auction concession is probably best measured at the individual bond level rather than 
averaging free float for each operation (as is done in Table A2.1 in the case of QE operations). Thus 
Figures A2.3-2.4 show how the price/yield concession for QE purchases measured relative to t-2 
varies with the liquidity of the bond at the individual bond level. At this level there is a clear 
















A2.3: Price Concession (t-2 to auction) by 
nominal free float (£bn) of bond 
A2.4: Yield Concession (t-2 to auction) by 
nominal free float (£bn) of bond 
  
As is noted in the text, the large auction concessions for QE operations could be related to the 
limited number of bidders for each bond. Figure A2.5 gives an indication of this by showing that, for 
all bonds eligible for each QE operation 16% were not bid for at all, 72% were allocated at a single 
price (almost certainly indicating a single bidder) and 12% were allocated at multiple prices (which 
could still indicate only a single bidder as each bidder is allowed to make more than one bid)16.  
A2.5 QE Auction allocations by bond 
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